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Transnational Government Hacking
Jennifer Daskal*
INTRODUCTION
Cyber investigations often involve devices and data that cross or are located
across international borders. This raises challenges for law enforcement which often finds itself limited by enforcement jurisdiction that stops at its territorial borders. What happens when law enforcement is seeking to access data or a device
and the location is unknown? What about situations in which law enforcement
has its hands on a device, but the data being accessed via that device is located in
another state’s jurisdiction? What if the device itself is located overseas—in a jurisdiction unwilling or unable to aid the investigation?
The United States addressed these issues, in part, in 2016 amendments to
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41. The updated rule now specifies that a
judge can issue a remote access search warrant if the location of the device or
data is in a location unknown and its location has been concealed via technological means. This provision provides an additional exception to the otherwise applicable geographic limits on judicial authority to issue search warrants.1
In the lead-up to the rule change, several commentators noted, often with concern, that this could lead U.S. governmental officials to inadvertently search and
access data and devices in foreign jurisdictions. One commentator suggested that
this could yield “the largest expansion of extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction
in FBI history.”2 Others warned that the unilateral accessing of extraterritoriallylocated data and devices could “put U.S. law enforcement agencies at risk of violating th[e] binding rule of sovereignty, as well as the principle of comity.”3
Some have further noted—correctly—the criminal law risks presented by extraterritorial investigatory activities that involve non-consensual entry into foreignlocated computer systems. Such actions could result in U.S. law enforcement
* Professor, American University Washington College of Law. Special thanks to Gary Corn, Ashley
Deeks, Jonathan Mayer, Cedric Yehuda Sabbah, Michael Stawasz, and the participants at the 2019
Cyber Symposium sponsored by the Journal of National Security Law & Policy and Third Way for
helpful conversations, suggestions, and input. An additional thanks to my outstanding research assistant
Daniel de Zayas. © 2020, Jennifer Daskal.
1. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(6).
2. See Ahmed Ghappour, Searching Places Unknown: Law Enforcement Jurisdiction on the Dark
Web, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1075, 1081 (2017); see also Ahmed Ghappour, Justice Department Proposal
Would Massively Expand FBI Extraterritorial Surveillance, JUST SECURITY (Sept. 16, 2014, 9:10 AM),
https://perma.cc/U52G-MTBP.
3. See Joseph Lorenzo Hall, Ctr. for Democracy & Tech., Written Statement Before the Judicial
Conference Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure at 4 (Oct. 24, 2014), https://perma.cc/
6LRG-2QMW; Richard Salgado, Google, Inc., Comments on the Proposed Amendment to the Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 at 3-4 (Feb. 13, 2014), https://perma.cc/L6K2-TN7E (noting that respect
for sovereignty precludes law enforcement from exercising enforcement jurisdiction in another nation
absent that nation’s consent).
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being subject to criminal prosecution under the domestic laws of the country in
which the data or device is located.4
Yet, despite the rhetoric, the Rule 41 amendments are of narrow scope. They
only address the very limited situation in which the location of a device or data is
unknown and has been concealed through technical means. In situations in which
a device is known to be located extraterritorially, the territorial limits on the U.S.
warrant authority continue to apply. U.S. judges lack the authority to issue a warrant to search. Rather, law enforcement is, as a general matter, told to instead
employ the mutual legal assistance process and seek the assistance of the government where the data or device is located—irrespective of the foreign government’s willingness to cooperate.
Meanwhile, there is a lack of clarity as to the rules that apply—and ought to
apply—if law enforcement has access to a device, but then seeks to collect data
accessible via the online-connected device. In many cases, the location of the
sought-after data will be unknown. Data accessed from the cloud may be located
outside of the nation’s territorial boundaries, even if accessed via a territoriallylocated device. This, raises questions as to lawfulness of the search under both
domestic and international law.
Governments have adopted divergent approaches. Australia, for example, requires
foreign government consent if the accessed data is located extraterritorially—even if
the device that is used to connect to the data is in the hands of law enforcement in
Australia. If, however, the location of the data is unknown and cannot reasonably be
determined, then access can be pursued; consent is not required simply because it is
impossible to know who to ask for such consent.5 Many others, including the United
States, do not publicly specify whether and in what circumstances law enforcement
can seek direct access if and when the data is known to, or may be, located outside
the nation’s borders.
The implications for security, privacy, and, in particular, the topic of this
symposium—the ability to identify and prevent cybercrime—are significant.
After all, law enforcement access to digital evidence can be an important tool in
criminal investigations involving digital evidence. But while there has been a fair
amount of literature on the related questions as to the geographic reach of what I
refer to as “indirect access”—situations in which law enforcement obtains evidence with the assistance of a third party, such as Google, Facebook, or any other
third party, rather than accessing data directly—there has been much less written
about the jurisdictional challenges that arise when the government is engaged in
what I call “direct access” — those steps taken by the government to unilaterally
access sought-after data, without the engagement of a third party intermediary.6
4. See Ahmed Ghappour, Comment on the Proposed Amendment to Rule 41 at 7 (Feb. 17, 2014),
https://perma.cc/Z5G5-UHAA.
5. Telecommunications and Legislative Amendments (Assistance and Access) Bill 2018 (Cth), s 43A
(Austl.), https://perma.cc/YMV5-FSEC.
6. On the indirect access issues, see, e.g., Jennifer Daskal, Privacy and Security Across Borders, 128
YALE L.J. FORUM 1029 (2019); Paul Schwartz, Legal Access to the Global Cloud, 118 COLUM. L. REV.
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The goal of this article is to identify and analyze some of the key unresolved
questions. The article starts by examining the current international law rules—or
really lack thereof—underlying remote access to devices and data across borders.
It then examines various domestic law efforts to regulate the remote accessing of
data and devices. And it makes a set of legal and policy recommendations
designed to guide law and practice going forward. Specifically, I argue that governments should, as a matter of policy and when reasonably possible, seek consent from foreign governments when accessing devices or computer systems
known to be located in a foreign jurisdiction. But I suggest that exceptions may
be required to deal with those situations in which location of data is unknown and
unknowable; the process of getting consent would unduly jeopardize the investigation or is simply impracticable given things like the rapid mobility of the data
being sought. And I suggest that consent should not be required if and when law
enforcement has physical access to a device and is merely accessing, via that device, data that automatically downloads from the cloud—even though there is the
possibility that some such data may be located out of the investigating country’s
domestic borders.
A few important notes on scope before I begin:
First, the discussion is focused primarily on the jurisdictional questions. It thus
references but does not delve into the critically important, and interrelated, questions regarding the specific procedural and substantive standards that do, and
should, apply to such access. These are key, foundational issues. Insufficient protections will make any such direct access illegitimate as a matter of human rights
law, no matter what the jurisdictional rules. The specifics, however, are complex,
demanding careful thought and analysis that are outside the scope of this short
Article.7
Second, the analysis assumes the prototypically easy case involving the targeted accessing and copying of data that leaves the relevant data intact and available for others to manipulate. It thus assumes a targeted delivery, localized
exploitation, and time-limited execution.8 But a range of other network investigative techniques also can be employed that can delete or alter data, engage in
ongoing surveillance, and spread vulnerabilities across systems. In addition, tools
that are meant to exploit vulnerabilities in a targeted, limited way can be
1681 (2018); Jennifer Daskal, Borders and Bits, 71 VAND. L. REV. 179 (2018); Andrew Keane Woods,
Litigating Data Sovereignty, 128 YALE L.J. 328 (2018); Commission Staff Working Document, Impact
Assessment Accompanying Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on
European Production and Preservation Orders for Electronic Evidence in Criminal Matters and
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Laying Down Harmonised
Rules on the Appointment of Legal Representatives for the Purpose of Gathering Evidence in Criminal
Proceedings, COM (2018) 225 final (Apr. 17, 2018) [hereinafter EC Impact Assessment], https://perma.
cc/AJ69-WJ2M; Peter Swire & Jennifer Daskal, What the CLOUD Act Means for Privacy Pros, INT’L
ASS’N PRIVACY PROF’LS. (Mar. 26, 2018), https://perma.cc/33HH-WDSG.
7. See SVEN HERPIG, A FRAMEWORK FOR GOVERNMENT HACKING IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS
(2018) (discussing the key issues); Jonathan Mayer, Government Hacking, 127 YALE L.J. 570 (2018).
8. See Mayer, Government Hacking, supra note 7, at 583-90 (discussing how government malware is
deployed, including the various phases of deployment).
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mishandled, misappropriated, or result in unintended consequences.9 Technological, procedural, and substantive safeguards and protections are needed to
address those risks. Situations in which law enforcement employs exploits
designed to alter or destroy data, devices, or systems or engage in ongoing surveillance raise additional legal and policy concerns and considerations outside
the scope of this article.
Third, the discussion of international law requirements is and should be understood as just that—a narrow analysis of what international law requires. This
analysis is distinct from an evaluation of best practices and policy. As I discuss
further in Part III, there are a range of policy and practical reasons why states
should, as a matter of domestic law, place limits on extraterritorial access to data
or devices, even if international law does not require it. Put simply, international
law is important, but it is not the only guiding factor. Thus, the discussion of what
international law allows should be read as separate from an analysis of what governments should permit.
I. INTERNATIONAL LAW
It is a longstanding principle of international law that one state cannot engage in
non-consensual law enforcement actions in another state. As a result, State A cannot send agents into State B to seize evidence for law enforcement purposes absent
State B’s consent. Doing so is generally understood to violate State B’s sovereignty
and is not permitted under international law.10 This rule makes sense. The idea of,
say, Russian law enforcement agents unilaterally and surreptitiously sneaking into
a home in Chicago to seize allegedly stolen art is creepy. And it is rightly understood as an international law violation as a result—one that would trigger the right
of the United States to take proportionate countermeasures in response.
Conversely, spying across borders is also generally understood to be permitted
or at least not prohibited under international law.11 Espionage can, and almost
always does, violate domestic law. But perhaps out of recognition that everyone
9. Interview by Sharon Driscoll with Riana Pfefferkorn, Fellow, Ctr. for Internet & Soc’y, Stan. L.
Sch. (Sept. 19, 2018), https://perma.cc/C7PR-49TL.
10. See, e.g., Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4, 34-35 (Dec. 15) (rejecting
argument that non-consensual evidence gathering in another state is permitted and therefore justifies a
violation of territorial sovereignty); S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at
¶ 45 (Sept. 7) (laying out principle that “failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary[, a
State] may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State”).
11. See Asaf Lubin, The Liberty to Spy, 61 HARV. INT’L L.J. (forthcoming 2019) (excellent
discussion of different legal perspectives on the status of spying under international law over time);
Ashley Deeks, Confronting & Adapting: Intelligence Agencies and International Law, 102 VA. L. REV.
599, 608-10 (2016); Ashley Deeks, An International Legal Framework for Surveillance, 55 VA. J. INT’L
L. 291, 300-04; see also TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER
OPERATIONS 169-170 n.22 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2d ed. 2017) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL 2.0]
(concluding that there is no international law prohibition of espionage per se); Gary D. Brown &
Andrew O. Metcalf, Easier Said Than Done: Legal Reviews of Cyber Weapons, 7 J. NAT’L SECURITY L.
& POL’Y 115, 116 (2014) (noting a “long-standing (and cynically named) ‘gentleman’s agreement’
between nations to ignore espionage in international law”); Asaf Lubin, Cyber Law and Espionage Law
as Communicating Vessels, 10 INT’L CONF. ON CYBER CONFLICT 203, 205 (2018).
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does it, espionage in the form of intelligence gathering is not explicitly prohibited
under international law. Thus, if a Russian agent enters the United States to spy
on a Chicagoan for intelligence gathering purposes, it would not, under the prevailing view, be a breach of international law—although the agent would be in
violation of the U.S. Foreign Agents Registration Act, among other possible
domestic criminal laws.12 Even those who argue that undercover spies who
cross borders violate the territorial integrity of the non-consenting state where
they are acting, and thus violate international law, generally agree that
“remote” espionage, or surveillance that takes place without the crossing of
humans across international borders, is lawful, or at least not prohibited by
international law.13
This then raises foundational questions about how to categorize the remote
accessing of data by law enforcement. What if Russian law enforcement remotely
and surreptitiously accesses U.S.-located 0s and 1s of interest without ever leaving Russia—leaving the data unaltered in any way that affects its ongoing manipulation and use? First, as a threshold measure, it is unclear if the Russian is acting
territorially, based on where the agent is physically located or extraterritorially,
based on where the data is located.
Second, assuming Russia is considered to be engaging in an extraterritorial
enforcement action, is it best analogized to the kind of extraterritorial law
enforcement actions that are prohibited? Or is it more like espionage and
permitted—or at least not explicitly prohibited?
The answers to these questions turn on an assessment of both territoriality and
the meaning and status of sovereignty under international law. It is to these questions that I now turn.
A. Territorial or Extraterritorial?
In prior work I have explored what I call the “un-territoriality of data”—
namely, the ways in which modern technology challenges basic assumptions as
to what is “here” and “there,” thereby forcing a rethinking of what is territorial
and what is extraterritorial.14 How one answers these questions matters.
Territoriality, after all, has long been, and remains, a key foundational principle
underlying an array of international law rules and norms.15
But as I argued previously, and as debates about remote access to data exemplify, the ways in which data moves, is stored, and is accessed across territorial
borders raise foundational questions as to how to assess territoriality. Is territoriality linked to the location of data? The location of the person accessing the

12. See 22 U.S.C §§ 611-621 (2018). If, however, coupled with a coercive action, such as, say,
destroying the target Chicagoan’s office or home, then the actions would rise to the level of a prohibited
intervention, thereby triggering the right of countermeasures on the part of the United States.
13. See Lubin, The Liberty to Spy, supra note 11 (describing and critiquing this approach).
14. See Jennifer Daskal, The Un-Territoriality of Data, 125 YALE L.J. 326, 329 (2015).
15. Contrary to the claims of some, I have never suggested otherwise. See, e.g., Andrew Keane
Woods, Against Data Exceptionalism, 68 STAN. L. REV. 729, 734 n.20 (2016).
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data? The location of the person or entity whose data is being accessed? As the
question was posed in a European Commission report dealing with the related
issue of indirect access, what are the “connecting factors” that matter?16
There are various possible answers to these questions. One perspective is
represented by what I refer to as the data territorialists—those who focus on
the location of the data as the key basis for asserting territorial control. China
is squarely in that camp. As is Russia, albeit in a slightly modified form. A data
territorialist approach is implicit in the many calls for data location as a means
of asserting or guaranteeing access to data as well as other forms of regulatory
control.17 Even those who ostensibly support the free flow of data exhibit data
territorialist tendencies at time. In restricting the transfers of data outside the
EU absent a finding of adequate data protection safeguards, the EU, for example, presumes that location of data (whether in or out of the EU) dictates
control.18
Another approach, as expressed in the Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International
Law Applicable to Cyber Operations, focuses, for purposes on law enforcement
jurisdiction, on where the data is “meant to be accessible from,” rather than its
actual location.19 If data is “publicly available”—such as that on the open
Internet—accessing of that data is a territorial exercise of jurisdiction, regardless
of where the underlying 0s and 1s are located.20 This position is also reflected in
the Council of Europe’s Budapest Convention.21 But the Tallinn Manual goes a
step further than what is authorized by the Budapest Convention—applying this
rule to non-publicly available information as well. If non-publicly available information, such as the content of chats, closed online forums, or non-indexed
Internet hosting services such as Tor, is “meant to” be accessible to at least one

16. EC Impact Assessment, supra note 6, at 28 n.44.
17. See, e.g., ALBRIGHT STONEBRIDGE GROUP, DATA LOCALIZATION: A CHALLENGE TO GLOBAL
COMMERCE AND THE FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION (2015), https://perma.cc/GJJ2-SJ74. There are a
range of different reasons why nations impose such restrictions, some but not all connected to a desire to
establish exclusive territorial-based control. See Courtney Bowman, Data Localization Laws: An
Emerging Global Trend, JURIST (Jan. 6, 2017, 9:53 AM), https://perma.cc/JYA2-W3JP.
18. Commission Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, art. 48 [hereinafter GDPR]. The United
States also adopts a version of data sovereignty with respect to transfer restrictions embedded in the
Stored Communications Act, which prohibits U.S.-based providers from disclosing communications
content to foreign governments. Unlike the category of data sovereignty I am focused on here, however,
the restrictions are not tied to data location. In other words, the restrictions arguably limit such transfers
whether the underlying data is held in the United States or not.
19. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 11, at 69-70 (drafted by leading international law scholars
from around the world); id. at 2-3 (describing the Manual as a “reflection of the law as it existed at the
point of the Manual’s adoption,” rather than a best practices or progressive policy guide); see also
Michael N. Schmitt & Liis Vihul, Sovereignty in Cyberspace: Lex Lata Vel Non?, 111 AM. J. INT’L L.
UNBOUND 213, 214 (2017).
20. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 11, at 69 ¶ 12.
21. Convention on Cybercrime [hereinafter Budapest Convention], art. 32(a), opened for signature
Nov. 23, 2001, 10 E.T.S. 185, https://perma.cc/47Q3-SAQW (specifying that “a Party may, without the
authorization of another Party. . . access publicly available (open source) stored computer data,
regardless of where the data is located geographically”).
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user in the state, then access is territorial, according to the Tallinn Manual. The
location of the underlying data is irrelevant in those situations.22
Consistent with this approach, the Tallinn Manual also considers government
action to be territorial if law enforcement uses false pretenses to obtain the relevant
password and access non-public data accessible to someone in the state’s territorial
borders. So long as the data was meant to be accessible to someone in the state, it does
not matter that law enforcement logs onto a site housed on servers located outside the
nation’s border; the fact that it was not meant to be accessed by the investigating law
enforcement agents is irrelevant.23 If, however, law enforcement is accessing data
“not meant to” be made available to anyone in the state, such as the data stored on a
personal computer located outside the state, then access is deemed extraterritorial.24
According to this dividing line, the accessing of extraterritorially-located data
from a territorially-located device is almost always a territorial action. That data
is “meant to” be accessed from within the state. By contrast, the remote access of
an extraterritorially-located personal device is almost always an extraterritorial
action, absent some basis for concluding that the device was meant to be remotely
accessible.
As Professor Kirsten Eisensechr has ably articulated, the practical and normative questions raised by this approach are myriad:25 How does one ascertain what
is “meant to” be accessible? “Meant to” by whom—the user, the service provider,
or some combination thereof? What about the temporal issues? If a user travels
overseas and remotely accesses data while doing so, is it “meant to” be accessible
in that location for the time period the person is traveling, into perpetuity, or
something in between? And what about the situations in which an overseas employee is given permission to remotely access a company’s computer systems,
via a remote desktop program or other means? Is law enforcement acting territorially if it remotely accesses that company’s overseas networks, simply because a
single employee within the state is “meant to” have access?26 In addition to the
range of practical difficulties, it is normatively problematic to base an assessment
of territoriality on user intent and actions, particularly in those situations in which
most key operations and players are located extraterritorially.
A modified approach—and one that I have long supported in connection with
the related debates on indirect access—also focuses on factors other than location
of data and proposes a multi-factored assessment that incorporates things like the
location and nationality of the target, rather than where data is “meant to” be
accessed from.27 This alternative approach is premised on respect for the

22. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 11, at 69-70 ¶ 13.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 70 ¶ 14.
25. See Kristen E. Eichensehr, Data Extraterritoriality, 95 TEX. L. REV. 145, 150-54 (2017).
26. Id. (laying out these and related questions that arise).
27. See Jennifer Daskal, Borders and Bits, 71 VAND. L. REV. 179 (2018); Jennifer Daskal, Peter
Swire & Théodore Christakis, The Globalization of Criminal Evidence, INT’L ASS’N PRIVACY PROF’LS.
(Oct. 16, 2018), https://perma.cc/FQ8P-ZBLV.
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sovereign interest in protecting territorial integrity. But it takes explicit note of
the increasing mismatch between the technical infrastructure that spans the globe
and the physical borders of nation-states. It is thus premised on a recognition of
two key issues:
First, the location of data is increasingly delinked from key sovereign interests,
including, importantly, the sovereign interest in securing one’s own borders and
in protecting the security of one’s own nationals and residents. Defending against
national security threats can require access to—and at times manipulation of—
data that is located extraterritorially. Even local criminal investigations, involving fully local victims, perpetrators, and crime scenes, often depend entirely on
data that is located outside one’s territorial boundaries. As just one measure, a
2018 European Commission study found that 55% of the data of interest to EUbased law enforcement officials engaged in the investigation and prosecution of
domestic crime is held by providers located across territorial borders; much of
the relevant data is located extraterritorially as well.28 As a result, an understanding of territoriality that is linked exclusively to the location of 0s and 1s fails to
protect the underlying interest in promoting security, privacy, and other core values and interests that territorial sovereignty is meant to protect.
Second, how one defines what is and is not territorial is itself constructed. The
goal is thus to identify the core sovereign interest at stake and assess territoriality
in ways that, to the extent possible, maps onto and protects those interests. It
means looking at things like the location of the crime and the location and nationality of the target, rather than the location of data, in determining what is and is
not a legitimate exercise of the state’s law enforcement authorities—and hence
what is and is not understood as territorial.
This perspective supports the approach taken in recently enacted legislation in
the United States—and now implicitly endorsed by the European Commission in
its draft e-Evidence proposals—that the state’s relationship to the target of an
investigation matters much more than the location of the underlying data. Thus,
with respect to the related question of indirect access, U.S. law now specifies that
if law enforcement serves a judge-issued warrant or other lawfully-issued disclosure on a third-party company, that company must turn order must turn over all
responsive data within their possession, custody, or control, regardless of data
location.29 Yet, the law also explicitly recognizes that such broad authority to
search sometimes conflicts with foreign government interests in protecting their
own citizens’ and residents’ data. It thus incorporates a statutory motion to quash

28. EC Impact Assessment, supra note 6, at 14.
29. See Stored Communications Act, Pub. L. No. 99-508, tit. II, 100 Stat. 1848, 1860-68 (1986)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-12); Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data (CLOUD) Act,
Pub. L. No. 115-141, 132 Stat. 348 (2018) (enacted) (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). Of
course, there also must be jurisdiction to compel—meaning the provider has to have a sufficient
territorial nexus to the US to support such jurisdiction. See Justin Hemmings, Sreenidhi Srinivasan &
Peter Swire, Defining the Scope of ‘Possession, Custody, or Control’ for Privacy Issues and the Cloud
Act, 10 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 631 (2020).
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if, in certain, albeit limited circumstances, the United States is seeking the data of
a foreigner outside the United States and the request creates a conflict with foreign government laws.30 Here, the key triggering factor is the location and nationality of the investigatory target, rather than the location of the data.31 The EU’s
draft e-Evidence Regulation, if enacted, similarly would require providers subject
to EU member states’ to disclose responsive data, regardless of where the data is
located.32
By analogy, if law enforcement has physical access over and lawful authority
to search a device, the underlying data accessed via that device would not in and
of itself turn what would otherwise be a territorial search into extraterritorial one.
By contrast, the remote accessing of a device that is itself located across borders
would be deemed an extraterritorial search. That said, in both scenarios the
remote accessing of a computer network system or device across territorial borders directly by law enforcement raises additional issues that need to be taken
into account—issues I return to in Part III.
B. An International Law Violation?
The mere fact that something is extraterritorial does not necessarily make it
unlawful as a matter of international law. Instead we now must turn to the second
key question: Does the remote accessing of data, a device, or computer network
system across borders violate international law?
At a foundational level, international law scholars are currently engaged in a
heated debate about territorial sovereignty under international law and its

30. CLOUD Act §§ 103(a), (b) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(h), 2713). This, however, can only
be brought in the limited circumstances in which the conflict arises between U.S. and the law of
countries with which the United States has a bilateral access-to-data agreement authorized in a
separate part of the Act. See infra, note 31. As of this writing, that is a null set, although it is expected
that an agreement between the United States and the U.K. will go into effect in July 2020. The Act
separately includes a rule of construction, making clear that companies can raise common-law
motions to quash based on conflict of law concerns in those situations in which the new statutory
mechanism is not available, although does not provide any guidance as to how courts are to resolve
such claims. CLOUD Act §103(c).
31. A separate part of the CLOUD Act takes a similar tack. It establishes a new mechanism for the
United States to enter into bilateral agreements with foreign nations, pursuant to which the partner
countries are able to directly demand communications content from U.S.-based service providers,
subject to a number of procedural and substantive baseline protections. Yet, here too, the law
distinguishes between foreign access to foreigners’ data and foreign access to United States’ citizen and
resident data—permitting foreign government direct access to foreigners’ data only. If foreign
governments seek U.S. person data, they must continue to make a diplomatic request to the United
States, via the mutual legal assistance process, for that data. This reflects an assessment that U.S. rules
should govern access to U.S. citizen and resident data, whereas foreign government rules can govern
foreign access to foreigners’ data. See CLOUD Act § 105 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2523). For a more
detailed analysis, see Jennifer Daskal, Privacy and Speech Across Borders, Yale L.J. FORUM 1029;
Jennifer Daskal & Peter Swire, Frequently Asked Questions about the U.S. CLOUD Act, CROSS BORDER
DATA FORUM (Apr. 16, 2019), perma.cc/QWS4-L9C2.
32. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on European
Production and Preservation Orders for electronic evidence in criminal matters, COM (2018) 225 final
(Apr. 17, 2018).
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application to cyberspace. Is respect for territorial sovereignty a binding international law rule or a principle upon which other more specific rules are based? If it
is a binding rule, at what point is the rule of sovereignty violated? And if
not, then the question of line-drawing still exists: When does a cross-border
action violate other international law rules, including the prohibition on
non-intervention?
For drafters of the Tallinn Manual, territorial sovereignty is a binding rule of
international law—a position explicitly endorsed by the Government of the
Netherlands among others.33 That said, as the Tallinn Manual recognizes, it is not
always simple to determine when such cross-border cyber intrusions cross the
line into becoming a sovereignty violation.34 The Tallinn Manual thus lays out a
test for determining whether a particular cyber action violates sovereignty—those
that (i) cross a threshold level of intrusiveness, or (ii) interfere with or usurp an
“inherently governmental function.”35
But as the Manual also notes, there is disagreement as to when either of these
conditions are met. Among the disputed questions: Do actions that lead to a loss
of functionality but do not cause physical damage to the device or infrastructure
that houses the data constitute a sovereignty violation? What constitutes an inherently governmental function (a concept the Tallinn Manual asserts is critical but
does not clearly define)?36
Others take the position that sovereignty is a principle that provides a foundational set of norms undergirding other legal rules but is not itself an independent
legal rule applicable to cyberspace.37 This view was expressed by then-U.K.
Attorney General Jeremy Wright, in a May 2018 speech:

33. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 11; Letter from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of
the Netherlands, to President of the House of Representatives of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, app. at
2-3 (July 5, 2019) [hereinafter Netherlands International Law Statement], perma.cc/8TRS-DKBZ
(concluding that “that respect for the sovereignty of other countries is an obligation in its own right, the
violation of which may in turn constitute an internationally wrongful act” and endorsing the Tallinn
Manual approach); see also Schmitt & Vihul, supra note 19; Michael N. Schmitt, “Virtual”
Disenfranchisement: Cyber Election Meddling in the Grey Zones of International Law, 19 CHI. J. INT’L
L. 30, 40, 43 (2018).
34. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 11, at 19 (noting, in a classically understated manner, that
the “precise legal character of remote cyber operations that manifest on a State’s territory is somewhat
unsettled in international law”).
35. Id. The Netherlands endorsed this particular test for assessing sovereign violations as well. See
Netherlands International Law Statement, supra note 33.
36. The Manual lists various activities that it considers covered: the manipulation of data that
interferes with the conduct of elections, collection of taxes, delivery of social services, conduct of
diplomacy, and performance of key national defense activities. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note
11, at 22. Interestingly, the Manual also concludes that intent does not matter. A sovereignty breach
occurs even if unintended—if, for example, State A conducts a cyber operation against State B, but the
operation inadvertently causes loss of functionality in State C. In that case, State C’s sovereignty has
been violated by State A, even though State A did not intend such a violation. Id. at 24-25.
37. Gary P. Corn & Robert Taylor, Sovereignty in the Age of Cyber, 111 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND
207, 207-208 (2017); Eichensehr, supra note 25; Gary Corn & Eric Jensen, The Technicolor Zone of
Cyberspace - Part I, JUST SECURITY (May 30, 2018) [hereinafter Corn & Jensen, Part 1], https://perma.
cc/RZ4L-LT6N; Gary Corn & Eric Jensen, The Technicolor Zone of Cyberspace, Part 2, JUST SECURITY
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Some have sought to argue for the existence of a cyber specific rule of a “violation of territorial sovereignty” in relation to interference in the computer networks of another state without its consent. . . . But I am not persuaded that we
can currently extrapolate from th[e] general principle [of sovereignty] a specific rule or additional prohibition for cyber activity beyond that of a prohibited intervention.38

Attorney General Wright went on to emphasize: “The U.K. Government’s
position is therefore that there is no such rule as a matter of current international
law.”39
For Attorney General Wright and several cyber scholars, cyber actions that
cross into the realm of an intervention—generally defined as a coercive action
that interferes with the internal affairs of the state40—are prohibited. But violations of sovereignty that fall short of an intervention are not international law violations, even if a range of such actions could be, and are, criminalized under
states’ domestic laws.
In some ways, the scholarly dispute is a distraction. Even those who argue for
sovereignty as a binding international rule recognize that there are a range of
cross-border cyber-related actions that fall short of interfering with sovereignty.
And those who argue that protection of sovereignty is a principle, rather than a
binding international law rule, recognize that actions rising to the level of a prohibited intervention violate the law. Line-drawing is needed either way. And
depending on how one draws these lines, the two sides may not be as far apart as
it might otherwise seem.
That said, the starting point differs significantly for those who view sovereignty as a legally binding obligation and those who argue the need to protect
sovereignty is a principle, but not an independent rule. Those who take the
sovereignty-as-law position are more likely to find a range of low-level and
unconsented-to cyber actions across borders to be unlawful intrusions. They are,

(June 8, 2018) [hereinafter Corn & Jensen, Part 2], https://perma.cc/54H6-3LSR; cf. Daskal, supra note
27.
38. Jeremy Wright, U.K. Attorney General, Address at Chatham House Royal Institute for
International Affairs: Cyber and International Law in the 21st Century (May 23, 2018).
39. Id. France’s Ministry of Defense has also weighed in on the issue. See France’s Minister of
Defense, International Law Applied to Operations in Cyberspace, https://www.defense.gouv.fr/content/
download/567648/9770527/file/internationalþlawþappliedþtoþoperationsþinþcyberspace.pdf. But
as Gary Corn points out, despite the many claims to the contrary, France is equivocal as its views,
stating that an unauthorized penetration of its systems or effects produced on French territory may
constitute a breach of sovereignty and that the gravity of any breach will be considered on a case-bycase basis. See Gary Corn, Punching the Edges of the Grey Zone: Iranian Cyber Threats and State
Cyber Responses, JUST SECURITY (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/68622/punching-onthe-edges-of-the-grey-zone-iranian-cyber-threats-and-state-cyber-responses/.
40. See generally Philip Kunig, Prohibition of Intervention, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (2008) (defining principle of non-intervention); Katja S. Ziegler, Domaine
Re´serve´, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (2013) (“The notion
of domaine réservé (reserved domain) describes the areas of State activity that are internal or domestic
affairs of a State and are therefore within its domestic jurisdiction or competence.”).
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after all, legitimately concerned about a wild west of cyberspace in which states
can act with impunity across borders and manipulate data in ways that can have
practical effects or shape the balance of power, even if they do not involve the
use or threat of force.41
Conversely, those who deem sovereignty a principle rather than a binding legal
rule generally do so in order to enable states to more freely engage in a wider
range of unconsented-to cyber actions across state borders. The sovereignty as
principle perspective stems, in part, from a recognition that there are a range of
situations in which consent is either impractical, infeasible, or both. In the context
of law enforcement investigations, for example, consent requirements can risk
tipping off the very person who is being investigated. Complex counterterrorism
operations may involve data or devices located in multiple countries. In many situations, the location of particular data or a device may be unknown, making exante host state consent infeasible. Such an approach recognizes the messy reality
and thus reflects a desire to liberate states from the requirement of host state
consent.
C. Sorting it All Out
My goal here is to raise the key considerations, not provide a definitive
answer—an effort that would require a tome, or perhaps multiple tomes. In so
doing I make three overarching observations.
First, while this essay focuses on law enforcement access to data, the international law rules do not and should not vary based on whether the purpose of the
information gathering is for intelligence or evidence gathering. It might be tempting to say that, based on long-standing practice with respect to espionage, that
international law permits, or at least does not prohibit, cross-border information
gathering for intelligence purposes. And it might be tempting to say, also based
on long-standing rules with respect to enforcement jurisdiction that international
law prohibits cross-border information gathering for evidence gathering and other
law enforcement purposes.
But such a purpose-based test will be almost impossible to implement. It
assumes a clear-cut division of intelligence and law enforcement operations that
can easily be discerned, where in practice the lines between intelligence gathering
and law enforcement are often blurred. Moreover, even when there are relatively
clear-cut divisions between law enforcement and intelligence operations, information obtained for one purpose may ultimately be shared and used for another.
In such situations, how does one assess purpose? Based on the entity that did the
information gathering—an easily manipulated factor? Based on how it is ultimately used—a consideration that raises all kinds of practical complexities, given
the inevitable and perhaps lengthy time lag between collection and use?

41. See, e.g., David E. Sanger & Nicole Perlroth, U.S. Escalates Online Attacks on Russia’s Power
Grid, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2019), perma.cc/RAV2-VM3K (highlighting the risk of escalatory cyber
incursions and counter-responses across borders).
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I thus start from the premise that international law rules governing law enforcement access should focus on the nature of state action and its effect, rather than
the purpose or intent of the particular action. This approach also means that while
this essay is addressing the international law rules as they pertain to law enforcement, they should be understood as general rules that will have broader application, with implications for intelligence gathering—and, depending on the details,
perhaps counterterrorism and other operations as well.
Second, rules that categorically prohibit the non-consensual accessing of 0s
and 1s in another nation’s borders fail to protect the key sovereign interests at
stake—interests that are often delinked to the location of 0s and 1s. Such rules
give states undue veto power based simply on the fact that third parties have
decided to host data in their jurisdiction, even in situations in which the nation
has no articulable interest in the data other than the fact that it is physically
located within the nation’s borders.
Third, as a result, rules should be designed to reflect this reality. Those
who view sovereignty as a principle rather than a binding rule provide the
greatest flexibility to design the rules that better reflect the key interest at
stake—in an array of different areas, not just with respect to law enforcement.
But a similar flexibility could also be achieved by recognizing sovereignty as
a binding rule, but then defining sovereignty in a way that is tied to a range of
factors delinked from the location of 1s and 0s. No matter what the starting
point, a state should not be at risk for violating international law any time
they engage in the non-consensual accessing of data across borders, particularly in situations in which the state is seeking the data of one of its residents
or citizens, pursuant to lawful process, and the data happens to be located
extraterritorially, located within the borders of a state that has no cognizable
interest in the data other than the fact that relevant data happens to be housed
within its territory.42
Fourth, any approach, whatever the starting point, should be coupled with the
articulation of and commitment to baseline procedural and substantive human
rights standards that govern the accessing of evidence, wherever located. This is
critical to avoid what are the legitimate fears of a free-for-all in which nations can
act with impunity across borders and the standards devolve to the least common
denominator. Establishment and promotion of these baseline human rights standards support nations’ own sovereign interests as well.
Fifth, and finally, it is worth nothing that sovereignty itself is an amorphous
concept—one that means different things to different actors. As Professor Louis
Henkin put it close to a decade ago, albeit in a different context, “The meaning of
‘sovereignty’ is confused and its uses are various, some of them unworthy, some

42. See, e.g., Corn & Taylor, supra note 37; Daskal, supra note 27; Eichensehr, supra note 25; Corn
& Jensen, Part 1, supra note 37; Corn & Jensen, Part 2, supra note 37.
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even destructive of human values.”43 As Henkin also put it: “[W]e would do better than we are doing, if we saw in the tatters of our sovereignty not obstacles, not
as pretext for indifference, for isolationism, but responsibility and opportunities
to secure human values.”44 Whatever the approach taken, there is a need to establish clear red lines, norms of behavior, and responsibilities. Invocation of sovereignty, whether as a principle or a rule, does not answer the hard questions that
need to be addressed.
II. DOMESTIC LAW: KEY INITIATIVES & OPEN QUESTIONS
A range of countries have adopted, or are in the process of adopting, domestic
laws that authorize and set preconditions on the issuance of remote access warrants.45 Conversely, most domestic laws prohibit the unauthorized accessing of
data and devices within their borders. This creates an obvious conflict of laws.
Absent bilateral or multilateral agreement, the remote accessing of data or devices by law enforcement risks violating the domestic laws of where the data or device is located.
This section briefly examines the approaches of three jurisdictions—Australia,
the United States, and the U.K.—as well as that endorsed in the Council of
Europe’s Cybercrime Convention. These are hardly the only possible approaches,
nor are they the only countries and entities considering these issues. They are
chosen nonetheless because they reflect an interesting sampling that highlights
some of the key considerations and challenges.
A. Australia
Legislation enacted by Australia in 2018 authorizes the issuance of so-called
covert “computer access warrants”—enabling law enforcement to, among other
things, remotely access data and devices.46
As the legislation recognizes, sometimes sought-after data or devices will
be located territorially and sometimes extraterritorially. If Australian law
enforcement is accessing a device or data known to be located in a foreign country, law enforcement must first obtain consent of that foreign country. Absent
such advance consent, the resulting evidence is inadmissible in Australian

43. See Louis Henkin, That “S” Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and Human Rights, Et
Cetera, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 1 (1999).
44. Id. at 14.
45. See Telecommunications and Legislative Amendments (Assistance and Access) Act 2018 (Cth)
sch 2 pt 1 div 4 para 87 (Austl.), https://perma.cc/G68R-V25X; COUNCIL OF EUROPE CYBERCRIME
CONVENTION COMMITTEE (T-CY), AD-HOC SUB-GROUP ON JURISDICTION AND TRANSBORDER ACCESS
TO DATA, TRANSBORDER ACCESS AND JURISDICTION: WHAT ARE THE OPTIONS?, T-CY (2012)3, 29-42
(Dec. 6, 2012), https://perma.cc/S3XM-L597 (describing various European initiatives and approaches).
46. Telecommunications and Legislative Amendments (Assistance and Access) Act, supra note 45,
at sch. 2 pt 1 div 4 para 87.
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court.47 If, however, the location of the data is unknown or cannot be reasonably
determined, foreign government consent is not required.48 The legislation does
not specify what happens if initially the location is unknown, but then later it is
determined to be located extraterritorially.
Notably, the consent requirement applies with respect to both devices located
across territorial borders and to devices held territorially, when the data is located
across territorial borders. Thus, even if the device is in the hands of Australian law
enforcement operating within Australia, but data accessed via that territoriallylocated device is known to be stored on a server outside of Australia, Australian
law enforcement must obtain foreign government consent.49
Interestingly, the same legislation takes a different tack when dealing with
indirect access. Specifically, the legislation explicitly authorizes law enforcement
to serve technical assistance warrants on companies that are located outside of
Australia’s borders—so long as they provide services or products used by
Australians—without imposing any sort of foreign government consent requirement.50 These assistance warrants, in turn, can require providers to take steps that
will assist in the gathering of data, without limitation to the location of the data.51
The legislation thus adopts a dichotomy with respect to the treatment of direct
and indirect access. Direct access requires strict attention to and limits based on
the location of the underlying data or device. Indirect access does not. So long as
the provider serves Australians, the provider is obliged to disclose—or take
action with respect to—accessible data, regardless of the location of the data. I
return to this distinction in Part III.
B. The United States
In the Unites States, judges can, pursuant to the 2016 amendments to Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 41, issue a remote access search warrant if the location of the device or data is in a location unknown and the location has been concealed via technological means. If, however, a sought-after device is known to be
located extraterritorially, judges have no authority to issue such warrants.
As discussed above, these amendments were the subject of significant controversy. A primary concern was that judges would inadvertently authorize warrants
47. Id.; Explanatory Memorandum, Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendments
(Assistance and Access) Bill 2018 (Cth) paras 591-98 (Austl.) [hereinafter Explanatory Memo, Austl.
Assistance & Access Bill], https://perma.cc/8KF2-452L (explaining situations in which consent is
needed).
48. As the explanatory note makes clear, there may be “frequent[]” situations in which this is the
case, and the location of data is unknowable or indeterminable. Explanatory Memo, Austl. Assistance &
Access Bill, supra note 47, at paras 597-98.
49. Id. at para 592.
50. Telecommunications and Legislative Amendments (Assistance and Access) Act, supra note 45,
2018, sch 1, part 15, ss 317C, 317L (Austl.); Explanatory Document, Telecommunications and Other
Legislation Amendments (Assistance and Access) Bill 2018 (Cth) 9 (Austl.) https://perma.cc/92J66W2Y [hereinafter Austl. Assistance & Access Bill Explanatory Document].
51. Telecommunications and Legislative Amendments (Assistance and Access) Act, supra note 45,
2018, sch 1, part 15, ss 317C, 317L.
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to search and seize data or devices located extraterritorially. This was presumed
to be a breach of international law.52 But, notably, these remote search warrants
can only be issued in those situations in which the location is unknown and the
location has been concealed via technical means. If the device is known to be
located outside the United States, or if the location is unknown but has not been
concealed and thus there is still an opportunity to figure it out, then judges lack
the authority to issue such warrants. As discussed in Part II, it is not at all evident
that this kind of access does, or should, violate international law; at the very least,
international law is entirely unsettled on this point.
In contrast to the Australian legislation, U.S. law does not explicitly address
the additional and more controversial set of issues—whether and in what circumstances courts can issue warrants for extraterritorially-located data accessible
from territorially-located devices. This is uncharted territory. On the one hand, a
recent U.S. Supreme Court decision suggests, without specifying, that the territorial reach of the search turns on the location of the underlying data—an approach
presumptively would make the accessing of extraterritorially-located data outside
the scope of a warrant. On the other hand, a range of Circuit court cases involving
wiretaps suggest that the underlying location of data is irrelevant, so long as it is
accessed on a territorially-held device.
Specifically, in the case of Riley v. California, the U.S. Supreme Court indicated, albeit based on a very different set of facts, that the location of the data
being sought was key to assessing the territoriality, and thus permissible scope, of
the search. In Riley, officers seized a device from a suspect incident to arrest. The
U.S. rules on search incident to arrest generally allow officers to thoroughly
search the property recovered from an arrestee’s person. Yet, the Court set limits
in the context of searching digital evidence, prohibiting the search of a recovered
cell phone. As the Court put it: “[O]fficers searching a phone’s data would not
typically know whether the information they are viewing was stored locally at the
time of the arrest or has been pulled from the cloud.”53 The Court elaborated: To
authorize such a search would, in the Court’s view, “be like finding a key in a suspect’s pocket and arguing that it allowed law enforcement to unlock and search a
house.”54
The permissible scope of the search thus turned, at least in part, on the location
of the underlying data. While it might be permissible to look at data actually
stored on the phone, it was not, according to the Court, permissible to examine
data located elsewhere, unless law enforcement obtained a separate warrant to do
so. By analogy, the judiciary’s territorially-limited warrant authority would be
limited to territorially-located data. It would not reach data located extraterritorially, even if accessed from a territorially-located device.

52. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
53. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 397 (2014).
54. Id.
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That said, Riley dealt with a specific question about the search incident to arrest
doctrine and the scope of a warrantless search pursuant to that doctrine. The
Supreme Court did not and has not yet weighed in on the question as to whether
such a search would be permissible if a warrant had been obtained. In other
words, can warrants, which are territorially-limited, authorize the search of data
pulled from the cloud, regardless of the location of the data that is being
accessed?
In other cases, U.S. circuit courts have suggested that so long as law enforcement has lawful access to a device, it should be able to access information that is
reached via that interconnected device, without regard to the location of that information. In several cases, courts have concluded that officers lawfully on the
premises of a home can answer a ringing telephone and listen in – irrespective
of the location of the speaker on the other end.55 And in the context of wiretapping, courts have held that the required territorial nexus is satisfied so long as the
listening occurs within a judge’s territorial jurisdiction, regardless of where
the conversation takes place.56 In at least one case, a court has concluded that the
Wiretap Act can, as a result, authorize the listening into a conversation that takes
place wholly overseas, on the grounds that the interception took place in the
United States.57
Meanwhile, Congress has since weighed in, expressing its view that, at least in
the related context of indirect access, the location of data is irrelevant for determining territoriality. Pursuant to the CLOUD Act, territorially-located providers
are, in response to a compelled disclosure order issued pursuant to the Stored
Communications Act, required to turn over all responsive data within their “possession, custody, or control, regardless of whether such [data] is located within or
outside of the United States.”58 In the related cases leading up to the CLOUD
Act, courts were divided on the issue. The Second Circuit took the position, akin
to that suggested in Riley, that territoriality depended on the location of data–thus
concluding that U.S. law enforcement efforts to compel U.S.-based providers to
disclose extraterritorially-located data were an impermissible extraterritorial
exercise of the then-applicable statute.59 But numerous district courts in other
jurisdictions disagreed, concluding that territoriality turned on the location of the

55. See, e.g., United States v. Vandino, 680 F.2d 1329, 1335 (11th Cir. 1982) (adopting the view that
law enforcement officials, lawfully on the premises, can answer a ringing phone); United States v. Kane,
450 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1971) (same).
56. See, e.g., United States v. Henley, 766 F.3d 893, 911-12 (8th Cir. 2014); United States v. Luong,
471 F.3d 1107, 1109-10 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Jackson, 207 F.3d 910, 914-15 (7th Cir.
2000), vacated on other grounds, 531 U.S. 953 (2000); United States v. Denman, 100 F.3d 399 (5th
Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1121 (1996); United States v. Tavarez, 40 F.3d 1136, 1138 (10th Cir.
1994); United States v. Rodriguez, 968 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1992).
57. United States v. Cano-Flores, 796 F.3d 83 (D.C. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S.Ct. 1688 (2015).
58. CLOUD Act, § 103(a)(1) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2713).
59. In re Warrant to Search a Certain E–Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp.,
829 F.3d 197, 222 (2d Cir. 2016), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018).
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provider, and thus efforts to compel U.S.-based providers to turn over extraterritorially-located communications content were permissible.60
In sum, the issue as to whether and to what extent U.S. authorities can, pursuant
to a warrant, lawfully access extraterritorially-located data from a territoriallylocated device remains an unsettled area of U.S. law.
C. The U.K.
The U.K. also has passed relatively recent, albeit controversial legislation
authorizing, among other things, the issuance of “equipment interference
warrants”—namely, warrants that permit l“interference” with computer systems
and devices in order to obtain communications content and other data.61
The territorial limitations are instructive. Law enforcement chiefs can issue
such warrants, but only if “there is a British Islands connection.”62 There is, however, a British Islands connection if “any of the conduct authorised”—including
the monitoring, recording, observing, or listening—takes place in the British
Isles, “regardless of the location of the equipment that would, or may, be interfered with.”63 Nothing in the law requires foreign country consent where the data
or equipment is located.
With respect to indirect access, the same legislation also explicitly authorizes
the issuance of warrants requiring the disclosure of non-content data on operators
of telecommunication systems outside the U.K., so long as there is sufficient jurisdiction to serve the order. 64 A service provider is, however, excused from compliance if it is not “reasonably practicable” to comply.65 The legislation specifies
that conflicting legal obligations should be taken into account in deciding whether
it is reasonably practicable for an extraterritorially-located provider to comply—
but nonetheless assumes a broad jurisdiction to compel, at least with respect to
non-content data.
In 2019, the U.K. also adopted a new law—the Crime (Overseas Protection
Orders) Act 2019, which authorizes judges to issue overseas protection orders
requiring extraterritorially-located providers to produce a range of data, including

60. See, e.g., In re Search Warrant to Google, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 3d 1268 (N.D. Ala. 2017); In re
Search Warrant No. 16-960-M-1 to Google, 275 F. Supp. 3d 605, 619 (E.D. Pa. 2017), aff’g 232 F.
Supp. 3d 708 (E.D. Pa. 2017); In re Search of Content Stored at Premises Controlled by Google Inc., No.
16-mc-80263, 2017 WL 3478809, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2017), aff’g 2017 WL 1487625 (N.D. Cal.
Apr. 25, 2017); In re Search of Info. Associated with [redacted]@gmail.com that is Stored at Premises
Controlled by Google, Inc., No. 16-mj-757, 2017 WL 3445634, at *27 (D.D.C. July 31, 2017), aff’g
2017 WL 2480752 (D.D.C. June 2, 2017); In re Search of Info. Associated with Accounts Identified as
[redacted]@gmail.com, 268 F. Supp. 3d 1060, 1071 (C.D. Cal. 2017); In re Search Warrant to Google,
Inc., No. 16-4116, 2017 WL 2985391, at *12 (D.N.J. July 10, 2017); In re Two Email Accounts Stored
at Google, Inc., No. 17-M-1235, 2017 WL 2838156, at *4 (E.D. Wis. June 30, 2017); In re Search of
Premises Located at [Redacted]@yahoo.com, No. 17-mj-1238, slip op. at 3 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 7, 2017).
61. Investigatory Powers Act 2016, c. 3, § 99 (UK).
62. Id. § 107.
63. Id. §§ 99, 107.
64. Id. § 85.
65. Id. § 66.
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content.66 A precondition to issuing these orders, however, is the existence of
an international cooperation agreement permitting the issuance of such orders.
In October 2019, the U.K. and United States entered into precisely the kind of
agreement that would permit this kind of access—and in fact the Act was written precisely to allow the U.K. to be able to take advantage of the kinds of
access provided for by these agreements.67 Thus, if the U.K. serves a compelled disclosure order on a U.S.-based provider pursuant to this agreement,
the U.S.-based provider could be required to disclose data in its possession,
custody, or control, regardless of the location of the data. This is a broad assertion of authority, but is premised on consent; there must first be a data-sharing
agreement in place.
D. The Cyber Crime Convention
The Convention on Cybercrime takes the position that the direct cross-border
accessing of data is permissible in two situations: if the data is publicly available,
such as something one can access via a Google search; or if the party receives the
consent of the person who has the authority to access and disclose.68 Otherwise,
the Convention presumes strict territorial limits on searches based on the location
of both data and devices.
Thus, if, authorities are lawfully searching a computer system, they can
examine other data that can be accessed via the initial system—but only if that
data is in its territory or the authorities are proceeding with consent.69 If the
data is located extraterritorially, and there is no consent to search, it cannot be
accessed, at least according to the scheme laid out by the Cybercrime
Convention.
That said, an explanatory note was careful to note that the Convention only
addresses those situations in which “all agreed” that such kinds of transborder
access is permissible. The Convention leaves many situations unresolved, including the many situations in which the location of data accessed via a territoriallylocated device or system is unknown and unknowable, as well as situations in
which the location of the device or system is itself unknown and unknowable.
Subsequent reports by the Convention’s so-called Cloud Committee have

66. Crimes (Overseas Productions Order) Act 2019, c. 5 (UK), https://perma.cc/6HJ5-LEN2.
67. See Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland and the Government of the United States of America on Access to Electronic Data for the
Purpose of Countering Serious Crime, Oct. 3, 2019, U.K.-U.S., C.S. USA No. 6 (2019) (CP 178);
Jennifer Daskal & Peter Swire, The UK-US CLOUD Act Agreement Is Finally Here, Containing New
Safeguards, LAWFARE BLOG (Oct. 8, 2018, 2:33 PM), https://perma.cc/N5R8-HNDV. The agreement
does not go into effect until 180 days after being sent to the U.S. Congress, absent formal objection by
Congress, pursuant to the expedited procedures laid out in the CLOUD Act.
68. Budapest Convention, supra note 21, art. 32.
69. Id. art. 19(2).
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repeatedly warned that the “loss of (knowledge of) location” often makes the
principle of territoriality very difficult to apply.70
With respect to indirect access, the Cybercrime Convention, consistent with
the practice of state parties, assumes a broader jurisdictional reach. The
Convention requires states to pass legislation necessary to empower competent
authorities to order any “person in its territory to submit specified computer data
in that person’s possession or control.”71 Unlike with respect to direct access,
there is no explicit limitation with respect to the location of the data. For subscriber information (meaning things like name, IP address, and billing information) the scope is even broader: Any service provide “offering its services in the
territory of the Party”—whether physically present or not—can be required to
“submit subscriber information relating to such services in that service provider’s
possession or control.”72 A new draft article would go further, requiring state parties to the convention to set up systems by which State A can issue an order to a
provider in State B, requiring the provider to disclose stored subscriber information in its possession and control, regardless of the location of the data.73
E. Other Side: Domestic Law Prohibitions On Access
At the same time that several states are seeking or at least considering
expanded authorities for remote accessing of devices and data, an array of domestic laws prohibit, and in fact criminalize, the kind of access being pursued. In the
United States, for example, an array of different laws come into play, depending
on the particular action. The most obvious one is the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act, which criminalizes the unauthorized access to a computer, broadly defined
to include most data processing devices and facilities used to store data associated
with such devices.74 Other countries have similar laws. In 2002, Russia filed
criminal charges against an FBI agent for alleged unauthorized access to computers of Russians being (ironically) investigated for unlawful hacking.75 In fact,
unauthorized access to computers and related infrastructure is widely recognized
and treated as a criminal law violation.
This is a familiar dichotomy with respect to espionage. Espionage is conducted
by almost every state—hence its status as permitted, or at least not prohibited,

70. See COUNCIL

OF

EUROPE CYBERCRIME CONVENTION COMMITTEE (T-CY), CRIMINAL

JUSTICE

ACCESS TO ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN THE CLOUD: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE

T-CY
(Sept. 16, 2016), https://perma.cc/S764-W4NA.
71. Budapest Convention, supra note 21, art. 18(1)(a).
72. Id. art 18(1)(b).
73. See Preparation of a 2d Additional Protocol to the Budapest convention on cybercrime 14-16
(Council of Eur. Cybercrime Convention Comm. (T-CY), Provisional Text, 2019); see also Budapest
Convention and Related Standards, COUNCIL OF EUR., https://perma.cc/F4V3-QPER (indicating efforts
to adopt a new additional protocol).
74. 10 U.S.C. § 1030 (2018).
75. Mike Brunker, FBI Agent Charged with Hacking, NBC NEWS (Aug. 15, 2002), https://perma.cc/
8JR8-F44Y.
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under international law. Yet it is almost always, depending on how it is carried
out, a violation of the domestic law where the spying takes place.
III. A WAY FORWARD
This section will tentatively assess the way forward. As described in more
detail in what follows, this section operates from the premise that the kind of activity being discussed here—the cross-border accessing and copying of data for
law enforcement purposes, without more, does not violate clearly established
international law. Thus, the key question is not what does international law
require—a framing which takes us down a detour for which there is active debate
and no clear-cut answer. Instead the key questions are: what should states do as a
matter of domestic policy? And what rules, if any, should be pursued on an international scale? It is to these normative questions that I now turn.
A. Direct v. Indirect
Every jurisdiction considered in this essay applies slightly different—and
more restrictive—standards to direct accessing of data and devices across borders
than to indirect access. As a result, a range of laws now explicitly or implicitly
require providers to disclose data in their custody or control without regard to
data location, whereas the same laws often delimit state access based on the location of the sought-after data or device. This offers some reasons why indirect and
direct access are—and should be—treated differently as a matter of domestic policy and law.
First, indirect access incorporates an additional actor, and thus layer of protection, between the compulsory order sought by law enforcement and its ultimate
execution and disclosure. While many have expressed a legitimate fear of tech
companies being co-opted by the state, the reality is that these same companies
can, and do, take steps to protect customer data or resist overreach. In fact, governments regularly complain that companies act in obstructive ways, thwarting
access that they deem important.76 Such companies can and do also raise concerns if and when the request of one government conflicts with laws or obligations of another—something that puts them in the middle of conflicting legal
obligations and that they have an obvious incentive to raise and avoid.77 By contrast, when government actors are doing the searches directly, there is no additional third party to resist or raise concerns regarding a conflict of laws. As a
result, conflicting legal rules—and the perspectives of other foreign sovereigns
76. See Will Carter & Jennifer Daskal, Low-Hanging Fruit: Digital-Based Solutions to the Digital
Evidence Divide 18-19, CSIS (July 2018), https://perma.cc/CPM5-ZHZ5.
77. See, e.g., Hof van Beroep [HvB] [Court of Appeal] Antwerpen, 12e ch. Nov. 20, 2013, 2012/CO/
1054 (Belg.) (describing history of the case), translated in 11 DIGITAL EVIDENCE & ELECTRONIC
SIGNATURE L. REV. 137 (2014), https://perma.cc/6UHT-DA7K (discussing challenge raised by Yahoo!
based on alleged conflict of laws); Openbaar Ministerie v. Skype Communications SARL, Hof van
Beroep [HvB] [Court of Appeal] Antwerp, Nov. 15, 2017, 2016/CO/1006 (Belg.) (discussing challenge
raised by Skype based on alleged conflict of laws); Discussion supra note 30 (provisions of CLOUD Act
that explicitly authorize providers to raise claims based on conflict of laws).
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that underlie those rules—may not even be considered, let alone adequately
addressed.
Second, pursuant to an indirect access request, providers are being asked to
turn over data in their custody or control. Absent data transfer restrictions that
create a conflict of laws, providers can and do make data transfers across territorial border with some regularity. Requesting states are, as a result, seeming simply asking private actors to do what they do for all kinds of business and other
reasons anyway.
B. Accessing Data from a Territorially-Held Device
For reasons discussed in Part I, the accessing of cloud-stored data that automatically downloads on a territorially-held device does not violate international
law. This, in fact, is common ground between those who view sovereignty as a
binding rule and those who view sovereignty as a principle rather than a binding
international rule.78 Domestic law rules should track this understanding of international law and permit such access, pursuant to appropriate procedural and substantive safeguards governing access to the device and data located on the device,
to include, among other things, post-collection limits on retention, dissemination,
and use. But these procedural and substantive protections should apply irrespective of the location of the data. This is true for at least four reasons.
First, it is often not possible to identify the location of data accessed via an
Internet-connected device. Some such data may be held on the device itself;
some accessed from the cloud; some from within the state’s territorial jurisdiction; some from without. Imposition of a location-based limitation on data that is
set to automatically download onto a device can be incredibly difficult to implement. In fact, the only way to effectively enforce it would be to impose a categorical bar on connecting and accessing information via the connected device. To
extent such a categorical bar is put in place, it should be based on other factors
such as the risks to privacy or the security concerns resulting from the access to
potentially vast troves on data on the phone – not based on a hypothetical, but difficult to asertain, location-of-data concern.
Second, even if location can be identified, a single device or account may link
up to data located in multiple different jurisdictions, including jurisdictions that
have absolutely no connection to the investigation other than the fact that soughtafter 0s and 1s are held on a server within their territories. Requiring law enforcement to seek consent of each and every country that touches the data as a condition
for access may be practically unworkable, at least in a timely manner.
Third, and relatedly, a requirement that law enforcement seek and get consent
to access data from a territorially-held device can give foreign jurisdictions with
no actual equity in the case undue veto power, without actually protecting any of

78. See discussion supra Part I.B. In fact, the Tallinn Manual’s test for determining the territoriality
of law enforcement jurisdiction—whether or not the data was “meant to” be accessible—makes clear
that, in the drafters’ view, such access does not violate sovereignty or international law. Id.
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the legitimate equities or interests at stake. The time delays that will inevitably
result can lead to the loss of critical information and potentially undermine legitimate investigations. In addition, even if law enforcement knows where the device
or data is located, it may be in a place with which the requesting country lacks
diplomatic relations, or at least lacks good diplomatic relations. And if even the
diplomatic relations are sound, the other country may not have the sophistication,
resources, or motivation to act.
Fourth, when a user brings a device into a particular jurisdiction, that user is—
or least should be—on notice that the jurisdiction in which he or she is located
may seek to access the device, including data that is accessible from the device.
This is a very different situation from a user traveling to a foreign country yet
deliberately leaving his or her device at home.
In sum, domestic law rules can and should impose robust procedural and substantive limitations on the searches of devices in the government’s possession,
particularly given the depth and breadth of potentially available information. But
these rules should depend on things other than the location of data. For similar
reasons, the accessing of extraterritorially located data via a territorially-held device should not be deemed to violate international law.
C. Extraterritorial Accessing and Manipulation of Devices, Infrastructure, or
Networks Across Borders
Accessing of devices, infrastructure, or networks across borders raises different
considerations. So does the use of a device in hand to send an exploit to access
networks and devices in foreign governments in order to access and download
data that are not previously set up to be accessed via the device. Such kinds of
direct, non-consensual accessing of devices or data raise additional considerations and concerns than the accessing of extraterritorially-located data from a territorially-located device that has been already set up to access that data.
Here too, the international law questions are not clearly established. For those
who view sovereignty as a principle rather than a binding international rule, the
mere action of accessing and copying data from a device or system located extraterritorially does not violate international law. But even those who view sovereignty to
be a rule, rather than a principle also recognize that not all such cross-border access
usurps an inherently government function and thereby violates sovereignty. True,
there may be times when cross-border access does violate such a function—if for
example it interferes in a foreign state’s own law enforcement activities. But what if
law enforcement officials in State A are seeking data of one of their own citizens in
the investigation of a local crime that, for whatever reason, happens to be located on
an extraterritorially-located server or device in State B? Absent additional factors, it
is hard to conceive of how State B’s sovereignty has been violated.
Thus, I turn to what the rules should be—not what they are—and highlight
the ways in which direct accessing of a device or system located in a foreign
state raises additional concerns not present when law enforcement accesses
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extraterritorially-located data from a territorially-held device, in ways consistent with how the territorially-located device has been pre-programmed.
First, in authorizing the cross-border accessing of devices and systems, governments risk violating the domestic law rules in foreign nations, thereby potentially
exposing one’s agents to criminal liability, as well as international censure.
Governments should, as a matter of good policy and sound diplomacy, limit
actions that violate other nations’ laws.
Second, the user’s expectations are different. When a user has his or her device
on hand, the user is on notice that the jurisdiction in which he or she is located
may seek to access that device and the data accessible to that device. By contrast,
the user does not generally think that the device is also subject to foreign government surveillance. And in fact, there is something intuitively creepy about a set
of rules that permit states to surreptitiously access data and devices in other countries’ jurisdictions. Law and policy should track those user expectations.
Third, and relatedly, rules that give nations free rein to hack into devices and
systems in foreign nations creates a free-for-all—with dangerous implications for
privacy and security.
Given these considerations, governments should require, as a default rule and
matter of domestic law, that law enforcement agents first obtain the consent of the
host government before accessing a device, server, or computer system in another
state’s territorial jurisdiction. Such rules can and should incorporate exceptions for
instances in which: (a) the location is unknown and unknowable; and (b) seeking
host state consent would unduly risk compromising an important investigation.
Additional details need to be worked out. Before concluding that location is
unknown, for example, agents should be required to take reasonable steps to identify
the location. And in all situations, states should adopt stringent rules and procedures,
including a requirement of high-level approval, before allowing law enforcement to
proceed with a unilateral search of a device located outside its borders.
Ultimately, this approach should be adopted and incorporated into bilateral
and multilateral treaties—thus forming positive international law.
CONCLUSION
Direct access to data across borders can be critical in many criminal investigations. But whereas there has been an increasing amount of discussion about the
jurisdictional rules on indirect access—when providers are being compelled to
produce extraterritorially-located data—there has been much less discussion as to
the appropriate scope and limits of direct access. This essay seeks to jumpstart the
conversation and fill the gap—examining the international law rules, analyzing an
array of domestic law initiatives, and making tentative legal and policy recommendations for the future. As digital evidence becomes increasingly important to
even ordinary criminal investigations, and as the mismatch between our technical
infrastructure and state borders grows, a clear articulation of the rules, policies,
and practices governing such access will become increasingly important.

